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INTRODUCTION
Both the current and the prior presidential administrations have
attempted to engage in the strong exercise of the executive power to
regulate immigration. President Obama created the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) and Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability (“DAPA”) programs, while President Trump, among
other actions, issued his executive order entitled Protecting the Nation
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.
When Congress was unable to pass comprehensive, or even partial,
immigration reform, President Obama stepped in to create DACA. 1 On
June 15, 2012, the initial DACA program was announced. 2 Individuals
who entered the United States before sixteen years of age, were under 31
years of age, had continuously resided in the United States since June 15,
2007, and were out of legal status, could apply for relief if they were
currently in school, had graduated from school, or were honorably
discharged veterans.3 Noncitizens were barred from applying if they had
a significant criminal history. 4 Applications were accepted and processed
under this initial DACA program. 5 Individuals whose applications were
approved were granted deferred action – a temporary and insecure form
of protection from deportation – and work authorization in two year
increments.6 On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced that
he was expanding the DACA program by removing the 31-years-of-age
cap and pushing back the residence date to January 1, 2010. 7 At the same
time, he created a new Deferred Action for Parental Accountability

1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration, Address at the White
House Rose Garden (June 15, 2012) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration).
2. See id.; USCIS, CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTON FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited
May 17, 2017).
3. See CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTON FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, supra note 2.
4. See id. (a felony, a “significant misdemeanor,” or three other misdemeanors).
5. See USCIS, DATA SET: FORM I-821D DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS,
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-821d-deferredaction-childhood-arrivals (last visited May 17, 2017); USCIS, 2014 EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON
IMMIGRATION, https://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited May 17, 2017).
6. CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTON FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, supra note 2; Richard
Gonzales, DREAMer Deportation Case Raises Questions On Trump's Deferred Action Policy, NPR (Apr.
18, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/18/524610150/first-dreamer-protected-bydeferred-action-program-is-deported; Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Meet The Terrified ‘Dreamers’ in
Trump’s Crosshairs, VOCATIVE (May 12, 2017), http://www.vocativ.com/426459/terrified-dreamerstrumps-crosshairs/.
7. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Immigration
Accountability Execution Action (Nov. 20, 2014) (available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action).
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(“DAPA”) program for certain parents of United States citizens and
lawful permanent residents.8 However, as a result of the legal challenges
discussed below, expanded DACA and DAPA never took effect. 9
President Trump campaigned on promises to crack down on illegal
immigration and to ensure the national security of the United States. 10 In
an attempt to follow through on these promises, Trump issued a series of
immigration-related executive orders shortly after taking office. 11 The
most immediately controversial order, titled “Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” was released after 4:30pm
on Friday, January 27, 2017.12 The language of the order was vague, and
it took some time and work to determine what the order meant and exactly
how it would be implemented. 13 The order purported to bar admission to
the United States of all noncitizens from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 days; to bar entry to all refugees from
anywhere in the world for 120 days; and to place an indefinite ban on
refugees from Syria.14 When this initial order was subject to court
challenge, as discussed below, Trump issued an amended order on March
6, 2017, in an attempt to overcome the legal issues with the first order. 15
A strong immigration executive power derives from a theory of

8. Id.
9. 2014 EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 5.
10. This language understates Trump’s rhetoric; he used strong, inflammatory, and offensive
language in making and justifying these promises. With respect to immigration from Mexico, Trump said,
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” He also said, “we have some bad
hombres here, and we're going to get them out.” See Janell Ross, From Mexican rapists to bad hombres,
the
Trump
campaign
in
two
moments,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
20,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/20/from-mexican-rapists-to-bad-hombresthe-trump-campaign-in-two-moments/?utm_term=.875152b8fed7. With respect to Islam and national
security, Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” and
stated “there is great hatred towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.” Third
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10-12, Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d
1119 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 17-00050) (quoting Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President,
Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015) (available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=113841)).
11. Exec. Order No. 13767, 3 C.F.R. § 8793 (2017) (“Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements”); Exec. Order No. 13768, 3 C.F.R. § 8799 (2017) (“Enhancing Public Safety
in the Interior of the United States”); Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. § 8977 (2017) (Protecting the
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States”).
12. Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. § 8977 (2017); Meridith McGraw and Adam Kelsey, A
timeline of Trump's immigration executive order and legal challenges, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-president-trumps-immigration-executive-order-legalchallenges/story?id=45332741.
13. Phil McCausland, Trump Defends His Immigration Ban Amid Uncertainty, Public Outcry,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/civil-rights-groups-fight-trump-srefugee-ban-uncertainty-continues-n713811.
14. Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. § 8977 (2017).
15. Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 C.F.R. § 13209 (2017).
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immigration exceptionalism. As previously explained, 16 immigration
exceptionalism has been defined as “the view that immigration and
alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on government
decision-making . . . .”17 The theory of immigration exceptionalism stems
from the plenary power doctrine, or the concept that Congress has the
absolute power, immune from judicial review, to decide which
noncitizens to admit into and deport from the United States. 18
Immigration exceptionalism goes beyond the plenary power doctrine in
two respects. First, it extends to all aspects of immigration law, not just
entry and expulsion. 19 Second, it extends the plenary power doctrine’s
focus on Congress to the executive branch, and to the executive’s
relationship with Congress and the judiciary.20 Some courts and advocates
have described this as plenary power delegated to the agency, or the
power of the agency to act to implement Congress’ policy choices. 21
President Obama’s and President Trump’s actions, however, at least
arguably go beyond delegation; they are acting in part because Congress
has failed to do so.
In both instances, opponents to President Obama’s and President
Trump’s actions have raised legal challenges that include arguments
based in administrative law. First, twenty-six states, led by Texas, filed
suit challenging the expanded DACA and DAPA programs under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Take Care Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.22 The major administrative law arguments were that
the program was not valid because it did not go through the notice and
comment rulemaking process; because it was arbitrary and capricious or
otherwise not in accordance with the law; and because it exceeded the
substantive authority of the Department of Homeland Security. 23 Judge
16. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of
212(c) and 212(h) Waivers, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 111, 115-118 (2017).
17. Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999).
18. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 115-118; Kevin Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court,
2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 57, 58-59 (2015). See also
Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-15 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion
Case).
19. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 115-118; Motomura, supra note 17.
20. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 115-118; Cf. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and
Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1672-76 (2007) (focusing on the distribution of authority
between Congress and the executive agencies and the judiciary’s role in influencing that distribution).
21. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766, 770 (1972); Brief of Amici Curiae Law
School Professors in Support of Respondent at 16-17, Kerry v. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 131402); Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,
526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
22. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp.3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tx 2015).
23. Id. at 607.
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Andrew S. Hanen in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas issued a nationwide preliminary injunction banning any
implementation of expanded DACA and DAPA on the grounds that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their procedural APA arguments at
trial.24 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. 25 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on an expedited
basis in the October 2015 term and heard oral argument on April 18,
2016.26 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court, sitting with only eight
justices as a result of Justice Scalia’s death, was unable to reach
agreement to decide the case. The Court issued a single sentence per
curiam opinion on June 23, 2016: “The judgment is affirmed by an
equally divided Court.”27 This had the effect of leaving in place the Fifth
Circuit’s decision.
On June 16, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security issued a
memorandum rescinding the November 2014 memorandum that
expanded DACA and created DAPA.28 This would appear to have mooted
the lawsuit, as Texas did not initially challenge the original DACA
program. Texas and several other states, however, sent a letter to Attorney
General Jefferson Sessions stating that they would voluntarily dismiss the
lawsuit only if the Trump administration did away with DACA entirely
by September 5, 2017.29 If the administration failed to do so, Texas and
the other states threatened to amend the complaint to challenge DACA in
its entirety. 30
Second, Trump’s “travel bans” have been the subject of multiple legal
challenges. 31 In the most prominent and consequential case challenging
the January 27th Executive Order, the states of Washington and Minnesota
sued the Trump Administration.32 Two administrative law challenges
were among the ten causes of action alleged in the complaint: (1) the
24. Id. at 677-678.
25. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
26. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674).
27. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). Although United States v. Texas was before
the Supreme Court in its October 2015 Term, because the Court did not issue a substantive decision it will
not be discussed further in Section II.
28. Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K. McAlcenan, Acting
Comm’r, Customs and Border Prot., et
al. (June 15, 2017) (available at
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf).
29. Letter from Texas, et al., to Att’y Gen. Jefferson Sessions (June 29, 2017) (available at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3882101/Texas-et-al-DACA-Letter-6-29-2017.pdf.).
30. Id.
31. See Special Collection: Civil Rights Challenges to Trump Refugee/Visa Order, U. MICH. L.
SCHOOL:
C.R.
LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=44.
32. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017), 2017 WL 462040.
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agency action affected substantive rights and, therefore, required formal
rule-making pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 706(2)(D), and (2) the
agency action was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and contrary to statute in
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).33 In response, the government argued that
the federal courts did not have the authority to review the executive
orders, raising judicial review of agency/executive action questions. 34
District Court Judge James Robart in Washington issued a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of the Executive Order nationwide. 35
Trump asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to stay the
preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit refused to do so. 36 This case
was stayed after the March 6th Executive Order and subsequent legal
challenges. 37
Two significant cases also challenged Trump’s substituted March 6 th
Executive Order: State of Hawaii v. Trump and International Refugee
Assistance Project (“IRAP”) v. Trump. Both cases were initially filed in
response to the January 27th Executive Order, and amended to respond to
the March 6th Order.38 The state of Hawaii made the same two APA claims
as the state of Washington’s case. 39 Out of six total claims, IRAP made
three APA claims: (1) the Executive Order mandated discrimination on
the basis of nationality, place of birth, and/or place of residence and such
actions were arbitrary and capricious, unconstitutional, contrary to the
statute, and without observance of the procedure required by law in
violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-(D); (2) the changes made
to the refugee admission process by the Executive Order were arbitrary
and capricious, unconstitutional, contrary to the statute, and without
observance of the procedure required by law in violation of the APA, 5
U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-(D); and (3) the actions of the defendants required
or permitted under the Executive Order were arbitrary and capricious,
unconstitutional, contrary to the statute, and without observance of the
procedure required by law in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§
706(2)(A)-(D).40
33. Id. at 12-13.
34. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161-64 (9th Cir. 2017).
35. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012 (W.D. Wash. Fed. 3,
2017).
36. Washington, 847 F.3d 1151.
37. See Mike Carter, Seattle judge won’t rule on local challenge to revised Trump travel ban,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-judge-wont-rule-onlocal-challenge-to-revised-trump-travel-ban/.
38. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hawaii v. Trump, 241
F.Supp.3d 1119 (D. Haw. Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 17-0050); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 539 (D. Md. Mar.
10, 2017) (No. TDC-17-0361).
39. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 38, at 35-36.
40. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 38, at 49-51.
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District Court Judges in Hawaii and Maryland issued injunctions, and
the government appealed to the Ninth and Fourth Circuit Courts of
Appeal, respectively. 41 Both the Ninth and the Fourth Circuits upheld the
district courts’ injunctions of the travel ban, and the government asked
the Supreme Court to intervene. 42 As expected, 43 the Supreme Court
agreed to accept the case. 44 The Court will hear the case during the first
session of its October 2017 term. 45 In the interim, the Court issued a
decision lifting the stay, with some much-litigated exceptions.46
These very prominent attempts by Presidents Obama and Trump to
exercise a strong executive power over immigration and the equally
prominent opposition to them brought the complex role of administrative
law in our immigration system front and center. The questions raised by
opponents in both instances remain unresolved by the courts, but will be
crucial moving forward. Immigration remains a central and polarizing
issue in the United States; Congress appears at a stalemate; and presidents
and their executive branches will likely continue to push the envelope on
the exercise of their executive power over immigration. In fact, however,
these questions are not new. Administrative law has historically played a
role, albeit a shifting and uncertain one, in our immigration system.
Numerous immigration cases before the Supreme Court have raised (and
dealt with) administrative law issues.47
In the last seven terms (October 2010 to October 2016), a total of eight
immigration cases before the Supreme Court involved questions of
administrative law. The Supreme Court hears approximately 80 cases per
term, for around 560 cases over this seven-term period. 48 While these
41. Hawai'i, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119; Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539; Lee
Ross, Trump's travel ban lands in Seattle appellate court, FOX NEWS (May 15, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/05/15/trumps-travel-ban-lands-in-seattle-appellate-court.html.
42. Hawai’i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).
43. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Will Supreme Court rescue Trump's immigration travel ban?, USA
TODAY (May 11, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/05/11/supreme-courtrescue-trump-immigration-travel-ban/101523088/; Jaweed Kaleem, With new court filings, Trump's
travel ban appears more likely to reach Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-trump-travel-ban-court-20170401-story.html; Alan M. Dershowitz,
Why the Supreme Court will uphold Trump's travel ban, THE HILL (March 16, 2017),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/324336-to-block-trumps-ban-hawaii-judge-usespsychoanalysis-not-legal.
44. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
45. Id.
46. Id.; Amy Howe, Hawaii urges justices to deny motion for clarification on travel ban,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 18, 2017, 12:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/hawaii-urges-justicesdeny-motion-clarification-travel-ban/.
47. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415
(1999).
48. See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
S UPREME
COURT
OF
THE
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq.aspx.
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immigration/administrative law cases are just a small percentage of the
cases heard by the Court (less than one percent), this number is still
significant given the extremely wide diversity of types of cases heard by
the Court.
Two of these cases involved questions of when judicial review of
agency decisions is appropriate: Kerry v. Din, involving judicial review
of the consular denial of a visa,49 and Reyes Mata v. Lynch, involving
judicial review of a motion to reopen removal proceedings.50 Five
involved questions of deference to agency actions. Of these, four invoked
Chevron deference: Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez;51 Scialabba v. Cuellar
de Osorio;52 Mellouli v. Lynch;53 and Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions.54
The fifth case – Judulang v. Holder – applied arbitrary and capricious
review. 55 The final case is United States v. Texas, which involved the
appeal of the order enjoining the expanded DACA and DAPA programs
and raised issues of the extent of the executive’s power to act in the
immigration arena, when notice and comment rulemaking is required, and
when agency action is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. 56
I have previously argued that the application of ordinary administrative
and constitutional principles of law in immigration cases regarding the
availability of waivers under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §
212(h) and the former INA § 212(c) demonstrated the erosion of a theory
of immigration exceptionalism. 57 The failure of the courts to fully engage
on the administrative and constitutional questions in these cases,
however, resulted in many gaps and unanswered questions in applying
administrative and constitutional law principles, as well as an
irreconcilable discrepancy in outcome between 212(c) and 212(h). 58 I
argued that this failure was a vestige of the theory of immigration
exceptionalism. 59
In this Article, I analyze the application of administrative law
principles in the Supreme Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence, from
the October 2010 through the October 2016 terms, to determine whether

49. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
50. 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015).
51. 566 U. S. 583 (2012).
52. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
53. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
54. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
55. 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
56. 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tx. 2015); 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015); 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
Because the Supreme Court did not issue a substantive decision in United States v. Texas, it will not be
discussed further in section II, infra.
57. Rodriguez, supra note 16.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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this slow and uneven erosion of the theory of immigration exceptionalism
holds true on a larger scale. I find that it does. The Supreme Court cases
show a similar invocation of administrative law principles in some, but
not all, immigration cases where administrative law could be applicable.
Just as in the 212(c) and 212(h) cases, in many, if not all, of the cases
where administrative law was invoked, the Court failed to fully analyze
the relevant doctrinal questions. There are significant questions that were
not addressed by the Court, and some inconsistencies in those issues that
have been the subject of Court opinions. In its most recent case of this
type – Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions – the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to engage thoughtfully and explicitly with respect to the role
of administrative law, and particularly deference, in immigration cases. 60
As discussed below, however, the Court chose to instead avoid the
administrative law questions.61 As before, I argue that these gaps are
vestiges of immigration exceptionalism – a function of the courts’
lingering hesitation in applying administrative principles to immigration
questions as well as a practical consequence of the fact that courts and
litigants historically have been slow to consider the impact of
administrative law in immigration cases.
I initially began this Article as a description of what was occurring,
rather than a prescription of any particular outcome. However, the current
administration and its supporters have invoked immigration
exceptionalism to justify actions that violate statutes and the Constitution
and are harmful to individuals and the country as a whole. It has become
increasingly clear that the courts will play a critical role in checking these
excesses. 62 In addition, as the challenges to President Obama’s and
President Trump’s actions make clear, administrative law is an important,
existing tool for litigants in bringing these challenges to the courts.
I am not arguing that administrative law is the only or best vehicle
available for these challenges. It is, however, a potentially powerful
option that is currently available. With greater clarity in its doctrine,
administrative law can be an even more effective vehicle. I therefore am
arguing that the Supreme Court should engage in the application of
administrative and constitutional law principles in immigration cases on
a deeper level, in a thoughtful way that will provide real guidance in other
cases and an example to the lower federal courts. I am not arguing for or
against the application of any particular administrative law doctrine in
immigration cases, but rather for clarity in when and why each particular
60. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Supreme Court Immigration Watch: The 2016 Term -- Look Out for
Six
Decisions,
IMMIGRATIONPROF
BLOG
(May
15,
2017),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/05/supreme-court-immigration-watch.html.
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doctrine applies. This should result in the faster erosion of a theory of
immigration exceptionalism, which will then have the positive circular
effect of improving the analysis of administrative and constitutional law
principles in immigration cases throughout the federal courts.
In parts I and II, I will analyze the Supreme Court immigration cases
from the October 2010 through the October 2016 terms that do raise
administrative law principles. Part I addresses the two cases on judicial
review of agency decisions: Kerry v. Din63 and Reyes Mata v. Lynch.64
Part II discusses the five deference to agency action cases: Holder v.
Martinez Gutierrez,65 Sciallaba v. Cuellar de Osorio,66 Mellouli v.
Lynch,67 Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,68 and Judulang v. Holder.69 In
Part III, I consider the unanswered questions regarding the application
and effect of administrative law doctrines in immigration cases. In
particular, Part III.A looks at those immigration cases before the Supreme
Court where administrative law could have been raised but was not; Part
III.B focuses on the themes and questions that arose from the cases
discussed in Parts I, II, and III.A; and Part III.C discusses the
opportunities that the Supreme Court has to clarify at least some of these
questions in its next term, including in the Trump entry ban cases.70
I. AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS
In order for judicial review of agency action to be available, the federal
courts must have jurisdiction and review of the particular agency action
at issue must not be precluded. 71 Jurisdiction may come either from the
enabling act or from a general jurisdictional statute, most commonly
federal question jurisdiction.72 Once jurisdiction is established, there is a
presumption that judicial review is available. 73 The Administrative
Procedure Act, however, provides certain exceptions to this presumption:
judicial review is available “except to the extent that statutes preclude
judicial review or agency action is committed to agency discretion by
63. 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015).
64. 135 Sup. Ct. 2150 (2015).
65. 566 U.S. 583 (2012).
66. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
67. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
68. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
69. 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
70. See, e.g., Chuck Roth, Immigration symposium: Prelude to a turning point,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 29, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/immigrationsymposium-prelude-turning-point/.
71. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.02 (6th ed. 2012).
72. Id.
73. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05.
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law.”74
The Supreme Court heard two cases addressing the availability of
judicial review of agency decisions between 2010 and 2015: Kerry v. Din
and Reyes Mata v. Lynch.75 Din was concerned with the doctrine of
consular non-reviewability, while Reyes Mata considered judicial review
of motions to reopen in removal proceedings. Both cases were heard in
the October 2014 term along with Mellouli v. Lynch, a case invoking
Chevron deference discussed in Section II.C below. 76
A. Kerry v. Din
Kerry v. Din was heard by the Supreme Court during the October 2014
term. In it, the Court considered the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.77 In its most extreme form, consular non-reviewability is
the concept that there is no right to judicial review of a consular officer’s
denial of a visa.78 Fauzia Din, a naturalized United States citizen who first
entered the United States as a refugee, filed a petition for her husband,
Kanishka Berashk. 79 The petition was granted, but Berashk’s application
for a visa was denied by the United States Embassy in Islamabad,
Pakistan.80 The consular officer told Berashk simply that he was
inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(3)(B), with no further explanation. 81
Din brought suit in federal district court, seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the United States to properly adjudicate Berashk’s visa
application; a declaratory judgment that INA § 212(b)(2)-(3), which
exempts the Government from providing notice to an alien found
inadmissible under the terrorism bar, was unconstitutional as applied; and
a declaratory judgment that the denial violated the Administrative
Procedure Act. 82 The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that Din had a
due process right to review of the denial of her spouse’s visa, and the
procedures employed did not provide her with the judicial review to
which she was entitled under the due process clause. 83
Before the Supreme Court, the government argued that, even assuming
Din had a protected liberty interest, holding that she had a right to judicial
74. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05.
75. 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015).
76. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015); Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. 2150; Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S.
Ct. 1980 (2015).
77. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2128.
78. Brief for the Petitioners at 33-34, Kerry v. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402).
79. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. at 2132.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6

226

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

review of the consular officer’s visa denial could not “be reconciled with
the deeply rooted doctrine of consular non-reviewability, which bars
courts from second-guessing Congress’s choices about which aliens
abroad should be granted visas and from revisiting decisions about
whether aliens who appear before consular officers at far-off posts satisfy
the conditions Congress has decreed.”84 The government further argued
that consular non-reviewability was strongly established in the case law,
and that Congress had acknowledged it and left it in place. 85 The
government took a strong position in support of the plenary power
doctrine and against judicial review, citing such historical pro-plenary
power, anti-individual rights cases as Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, and Wong Wing v. United States.86 Din countered by
arguing simply that plenary power and the doctrine of consular nonreviewability were not as extreme as argued by the government and,
specifically, could not preclude judicial review of constitutional claims
by a United States citizen. 87
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, vacating the
decision and remanding for further proceedings. 88 The Court focused
substantially more on the scope of constitutional due process than on
judicial review of visa decisions. 89 Due process may also be considered
to be an administrative principle, however, as a constitutional limitation
on agency action. 90 Beyond this due process focus, the Court could reach
little agreement; there was no majority opinion. 91 Justice Scalia
announced the judgement of the Court and authored a plurality opinion
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas taking the position
that Din had no constitutional right that would have justified judicial
review. 92 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment in an opinion joined
by Justice Alito.93 Without deciding whether Din had a protected liberty
interest, Justice Kennedy found that the notice Din received with respect
84. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 78 at 15.
85. Id. at 33-53.
86. Id.; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950);
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
87. Brief for the Respondents at 35-39, Kerry v. Din, 135 Sup. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402).
88. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2131.
89. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Opinion analysis: Limited judicial review of consular officer visa
decisions – foreshadowing the result in the same-sex marriage case?, SCOTUS BLOG (Jun. 15, 2015, 5:02
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-limited-judicial-review-of-consular-officervisa-decisions-foreshadowing-the-result-in-the-same-sex-marriage-case/.
90. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 71, at ch. 5.
91. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2130.
92. Id. at 2131-2138.
93. Id. at 2128 2139-2141.
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to the visa denial was sufficient to satisfy due process. 94 Finally, Justice
Breyer drafted a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan holding that Din had a protected liberty interest
and had been denied the process she was due. 95
Given the Court’s primary focus on the constitutional issues, the
limited mention of administrative law principles, and the fragmented
nature of the opinions in the case, few conclusions can be drawn with
respect to the role of administrative law in immigration cases. Even here,
however, it is possible to see the erosion of immigration exceptionalism.
None of the Court’s opinions, including the plurality opinion finding no
protected liberty interest, argued strongly in favor of no judicial review of
consular decisions. 96 None of the opinions took anywhere near the strong
position against judicial review advocated for by the United States. In
fact, a majority of the court – Justices Kennedy and Alito in the
concurrence and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the
dissent – were engaged in some level of review of the consulate’s
decision. 97
Beyond this basic conclusion, there are more gaps than substance in
the Court’s treatment of the judicial review of consular decisions. First,
the Court did not fit the question at issue into our modern administrative
law framework. As discussed in the introduction to this subsection, under
the APA, once jurisdiction is established there is a presumption that
judicial review is available with certain exceptions. 98 These exceptions
include statutory preclusion or agency action that is committed to agency
discretion. 99 The Court did not so much as mention the APA, much less
consider the interaction of consular non-reviewability and the
presumption of judicial review. It is not clear whether the Court thought
that review of the consular officer’s decision was precluded by statute or
as a matter committed to the agency’s discretion, or whether it was
possible to fit the matter within the APA’s exceptions at all. Second, as
detailed in the amicus brief submitted by law professors, the basis for the
doctrine of non-reviewability in the case law was tenuous at best. 100
94. Id. at 2139-2141.
95. Id. at 2141-2147.
96. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 89 (“Among the opinions, there was no ready defense of the
doctrine of consular non-reviewability and no aggressive invocation of cases contrary to modern
constitutional sensibilities such as Knauff and Mezei.”).
97. See, e.g., id. (“A majority of the Court is willing to allow some kind of review of consular
officer visa decisions. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion would allow for more deferential judicial
review than Justice Breyer’s dissent.”).
98. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05.
99. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05.
100. Brief for Amici Curiae Law School Professors in Support of Respondent at 9-16, Kerry v. Din,
135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402).
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Again, the Court did not mention the doctrine by name or consider its
viability in light of its misinterpreted history.
B. Reyes Mata v. Lynch
Reyes Mata v. Lynch was also heard in the October 2014 term. In fact,
the Court’s decisions in Reyes Mata and Din were issued on the same date
– June 15, 2015. In Reyes Mata, the Supreme Court considered whether
the federal circuit courts could review an untimely motion to reopen in
removal proceedings. 101 Noel Reyes Mata was placed into removal
proceedings as the result of a Texas criminal conviction for assault.102 An
immigration judge ordered his removal, and Reyes Mata’s lawyer filed a
timely appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 103
Although indicating that he would file a brief with the BIA, Reyes Mata’s
lawyer failed to do so, and the BIA consequently dismissed the appeal. 104
New counsel for Reyes Mata filed a motion to reopen with the BIA
outside the 90 day statutory window for such motions, arguing that the 90
day period should be equitably tolled because of the ineffective assistance
of Reyes Mata’s original counsel. 105
The BIA held that although it had the authority to toll the 90-day
statutory period for filing motions to reopen, it would not do so in Reyes
Mata’s case because he had not demonstrated prejudice arising out of his
counsel’s deficient performance. 106 Reyes Mata appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that it did not have jurisdiction
to review what it considered to be the BIA’s sua sponte decision not to
reopen the removal proceedings. 107 Because the other ten Circuits had
affirmed their jurisdiction to hear appeals requesting equitable tolling of
the statutory deadline for motions to reopen, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict. 108 The Attorney General did not oppose
certiorari, agreeing that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion was wrongly decided,
so the Supreme Court appointed an amicus to defend the Fifth Circuit’s
decision. 109
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Fifth
Circuit, holding that the lower court had erred in holding that it did not

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Reyes Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015).
Id. at 2153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2154; Reyes Mata v. Holder, 558 Fed Appx. 366, 367 (2014).
Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2154.
Id.
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have jurisdiction.110 The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice
Kagan. 111 The opinion relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s prior
decision in Kucana v. Holder, which held that the federal circuit courts
had jurisdiction to review the denial of motions to reopen a removal
proceeding. 112 Justice Kagan explained that the fact that the motion was
untimely, or that it requested equitable tolling, did nothing to change the
Court’s conclusion. 113 Justice Thomas alone dissented. He would have
decided the case even more narrowly by remanding to the Fifth Circuit
for it to decide the question of jurisdiction without erroneously applying
a categorical rule construing all untimely motions to reopen as requests
for sua sponte reopening. 114
Both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision, Reyes Mata has
been described as “a hyper-technical question of immigration
jurisdiction.”115 It was narrowly decided, based on the jurisdictional
question alone, and was remanded to the Fifth Circuit to consider the
merits of the underlying question of equitable tolling of the statutory
deadline for motions to reopen in the first instance. 116 While it may not be
“one of the more memorable decisions from the Court’s October 2014
Term,”117 it reinforces several key points about the Court’s current
position on the role of administrative law in immigration case and the
erosion of immigration exceptionalism. First, as in the deference cases, it
is clear that ordinary principles of administrative law have a role in
immigration cases. Second, administrative law in the immigration context
does not mean abdication of all decision-making to the executive. Courts
act as an important check on the power of the executive branch in the
immigration context. Both points suggest the conclusion that the theory
of immigration exceptionalism continues to loose traction in the Supreme
Court’s case law.
These conclusions can be drawn much more clearly from Reyes Mata
than from Din, of course. Despite this increased clarity, however, there
are still significant gaps in Reyes Mata’s analysis. Just as in Din, the Court
110. Id. at 2154, 2156-57.
111. Id. at 2153.
112. Id. at 2154-56; Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010).
113. Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2154-56.
114. Id. at 2157-58.
115. Steve Vladeck, Opinion analysis: Distinguishing between jurisdiction over (and the merits of)
untimely
immigration
appeals,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jun.
15,
2015,
11:59
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-distinguishing-between-jurisdiction-over-andthe-merits-of-untimely-immigration-appeals/; Steve Vladeck, Argument preview: What happens when
deadlines in removal proceedings are missed due to ineffective assistance of counsel?, (Apr. 27, 2015,
11:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/argument-preview-what-happens-when-deadlines- inremoval-proceedings-are-missed-due-to-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel/.
116. Reyes Mata, 135 S. Ct. 2150; Vladeck, supra note 115.
117. Vladeck, supra note 115.
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did not consider how the question of judicial review at issue fits into the
modern administrative law framework.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
Once it is established that judicial review of a particular agency action
is available, the focus then shifts to the scope of that review. That is, from
zero deference to complete deference, how far can a reviewing court go
in scrutinizing the agency action? The answer to this question depends in
large part on the type of agency action at issue – an interpretation of a
statute, an interpretation of a regulation, a factual determination, a
discretionary determination, or some hybrid of the above. 118 Determining
within which category a particular agency action falls can be challenging
for many reasons, including the fact that there are no bright lines between
these categories. Once that determination is made, generally speaking a
reviewing court will be more deferential to an agency’s factual or
discretionary determinations than to its legal conclusions. 119
The analysis of the scope of judicial review starts with 5 U.S.C. § 706,
the APA’s provision on the scope of judicial review. It provides:
The reviewing court shall— . . .
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record
of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
Courts have developed doctrinal tests – including most prominently
Chevron deference for agency’s legal conclusions120 – that overlay the
statutory language for the purpose of providing more guidance to courts
118. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 74-79 (5th ed. 2006).
119. Id. at 75.
120. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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on the scope of their review. Between the October 2010 and October 2016
terms, the Supreme Court considered the scope of judicial review in
immigration cases concerning the agency’s interpretation of the relevant
statute and concerning agency policymaking, or discretionary
determinations. Section II.A below discusses the Supreme Court’s
application of Chevron deference to agency legal conclusions. Part II.B
considers the Supreme Court’s application of arbitrary and capricious
review to an agency statement of policy.
Despite the limitations on its scope, judicial review “is generally
regarded as the most significant safeguard available to curb excesses in
administrative action.”121 While it may seem counterintuitive to talk about
principles of agency deference as a means of controlling agency action,
this is, in fact, the case. The APA and the judicially developed guidance
on deference provide standards by which to review agency action. If
agency action does not meet these standards, it will be struck down. While
we group these standards under the heading of deference, they are as
much about judicial control as they are about respecting agency expertise.
In the immigration context, under a strong theory of immigration
exceptionalism, the alternative to these standards for reviewing agency
action is to let the agency action stand. Applying those principles of
administrative law that are applied without serious question in other
administrative areas and that have the possibility of overturning agency
action, then, does demonstrate the erosion of this theory of immigration
exceptionalism.
A. Agency Legal Conclusions – Chevron Deference
The Supreme Court invoked Chevron deference as part of its review of
agency legal conclusions in four immigration decisions between 2010 and
2016: Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers, consolidated
and issued on May 12, 2012;122 Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, issued on
June 9, 2014;123 Mellouli v. Lynch, issued on June 1, 2015;124 and Esquivel
Quintana v. Sessions, issued on May 30, 2017.125 Each case involved a
distinctly different facet of immigration law. Gutierrez and Sawyers,
discussed in section II.A.1, involved applications for cancellation of
removal by lawful permanent residents. 126 Cuellar de Osorio, discussed

121. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 74 (5th ed. 2006).
122. Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012).
123. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
124. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
125. Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
126. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. at 2012.
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in section II.A.2, related to certain family-based applications for
immigrant visas.127 Mellouli, discussed in section II.A.3, interpreted the
controlled substance grounds of deportability. 128 Finally, Esquivel
Quintana, discussed in section II.A.4, construed the meaning of one of
the aggravated felony grounds of deportability, specifically sexual abuse
of a minor.129
The first three cases were ultimately resolved at step two of the
Chevron analysis. The Court found the agency’s interpretation reasonable
in Martinez Guttierez and Cuellar de Osorio, but unreasonable in
Mellouli.130 The Court also overturned the agency’s interpretation in
Esquivel Quintana, but on the grounds that it was “unambiguously
foreclose[d]” by the statute. 131 As discussed below, the Court’s
explanation of how this determination fits within the Chevron framework
lacks clarity.132
1. Holder v. Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers
Damien Antonio Sawyers’ and Carlos Martinez Gutierrez’ cases were
heard by the Supreme Court in the October 2011 term. 133 Both cases
turned on the BIA’s interpretation of language in INA § 240A(a), the
section of the Act providing for cancellation of removal for lawful
permanent residents who meet certain qualifications.134 This section
provides, in relevant part, that the Attorney General may cancel the
removal of an inadmissible or deportable noncitizen if the noncitizen “(1)
has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less
than 5 years” and “(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7
years after having been admitted in any status.”135 Martinez Gutierrez
could not meet either requirement on his own, and Sawyers could not
meet the seven year continuous residence requirement on his own, so both
noncitizens argued that a parent’s years of continuous residence or lawful
permanent resident (“LPR”) status should be imputed to them. 136 The
Board of Immigration Appeals in both cases rejected this argument,
interpreting INA § 240A(a)(1) and (2) as requiring that a noncitizen meet
127. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2193.
128. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1981.
129. Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1565.
130. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. at 591; Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2195; Mellouli, 135 S.
Ct. at 1989.
131. Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1572.
132. See infra section II.A.4.
133. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583.
134. Id. at 586-88.
135. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(1)-(2) (2008).
136. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. at 588-92.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/6

18

Rodriguez: Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: Administrative Law in the Sup

2018]

IMMIGRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

233

the requirements for years of lawful permanent resident status and
continuous residence on his or her own. 137 This rejection was part of a
long-standing disagreement involving multiple cases between the BIA
and the Ninth Circuit over the imputation of lawful residence for purposes
of cancellation of removal and its predecessor, relief under the former
section INA 212(c).138 Both Martinez Gutierrez and Sawyers appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 139
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit issued brief, unpublished memorandum
opinions remanding the cases to the BIA for reconsideration in light of
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder.140 In
Mercado-Zazueta, the Ninth Circuit was concerned with only whether a
parent’s years as a permanent resident could be imputed to a minor child
for purposes of satisfying the five-year permanent residence requirement
for cancellation of removal.141 While the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is
somewhat difficult to parse, it appears to have held (1) that this question
was controlled by a previous Ninth Circuit decision, Cuevas-Gaspar v.
Gonzales,142 and (2) because the BIA’s interpretation conflicted with
Cuevas-Gaspar it was unreasonable at step two of a Chevron analysis.143
In a relatively straightforward application of the Chevron analysis,
Cuevas-Gaspar held that the BIA’s interpretation of INA § 240A(a)(2)
finding that a parent’s continuous residence could not be imputed to a
minor child for purposes of satisfying the seven-year continuous
residence requirement for cancellation of removal was unreasonable at
Chevron step two.144
The Attorney General concurrently filed petitions for a writ of
certiorari in both Sawyers and Gutierrez to ensure that the BIA’s
interpretation regarding the imputation of a parent’s status for both
requirements, seven years continuous residence and five years lawful
permanent residence, were before the Supreme Court. 145 Certiorari was
137. Id. at 590-92.
138. See also Jill E. Family, Argument preview: Calculating relief from removal, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 13, 2012, 11:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/argument-preview-calculating-relieffrom-removal/ (“[T]he BIA and the Ninth Circuit engaged in an imputation tug of war that only an
administrative law professor could love.”).
139. Sawyers v. Holder, 399 Fed. Appx. 313 (9th Cir. 2010); Gutierrez v. Holder, 411 Fed. Appx.
121 (9th Cir. 2011).
140. Sawyers, 399 Fed. Appx. at 314; Gutierrez, 411 Fed. Appx. at 122 (both citing MercadoZazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)).
141. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1103.
142. 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).
143. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1115.
144. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1021-29.
145. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Holder v. Sawyers, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) (No. 10-1543);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012) (No. 10-1542).
Certiorari was apparently not sought in Mercado-Zazueta.
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granted over Sawyers’ and Martinez Gutierrez’ opposition in September
2011, and the cases were consolidated. 146
After detailing the history of the various positions on imputation taken
by the Ninth Circuit and the BIA and the relevant facts of the individual
cases, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled
in favor of the Attorney General.147 Justice Kagan wrote the opinion for a
unanimous Court.148 The Court focused its analysis on step two of the
Chevron framework: whether the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory
language was reasonable and therefore deserving of deference. 149 In
analyzing whether the BIA’s construction was reasonable, the Court
began with analyzing the consistency of the BIA’s position with the
statutory text.150 It also considered the history and context of the statute, 151
the purpose of the statute as a whole, 152 the consistency of the BIA’s
interpretation with its interpretation of similar statutory provisions, 153 and
whether the BIA understood that it was exercising its interpretive
authority. 154 Although the Supreme Court in Martinez Gutierrez did not
cite to non-immigration cases in support of considering these factors, all
of them are relatively uncontroversial factors commonly raised at
Chevron step two.
The Court emphasized the purpose of deference and the need for the
courts not to replace the agency’s judgement with their own in several
places. At the beginning of its step two analysis, it stated that the BIA’s
interpretation “prevails if it is a reasonable construction of the statute,
whether or not it is the only possible interpretation or even the one a court
might think best.”155 At the end of its opinion, the Court stated more
explicitly “the decision reads like a multitude of agency interpretations—
not the best example, but far from the worst—to which we and other
courts have routinely deferred.”156
The Court’s decision reads as a typical, straightforward application of
Chevron deference. 157 The Court did not hesitate to apply Chevron in the
146. Brief in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari, Sawyers, 132 Sup. Ct. 2011 (No. 10-1543); Brief
in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari, Martinez Gutierrez, 132 Sup. Ct. 2011 (No. 10-1542); Sawyers v.
Holder, 399 Fed. Appx. 313 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 564 U.S. 1066 (2011) (No. 10-1543); Gutierrez
v. Holder, 411 Fed. Appx. 121 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 564 U.S. 1066 (2011) (No. 10-1543).
147. Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 585-92 (2012).
148. Id. at 585-86.
149. Id. at 590-98.
150. Id. at 590-94.
151. Id. at 592-94.
152. Id. at 594-95.
153. Id. at 594-96.
154. Id. at 597-98
155. Id. at 590-92.
156. Id. at 597-98 (referring to Matter of Escobar, 24 I&N Dec. 231 (2007)).
157. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Opinion analysis: Deferring to (even more) limited relief from
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immigration context, and cited to immigration and non-immigration cases
alike to guide its analysis. While the Court ultimately deferred to the
agency’s construction of the statute, it did so only after an in-depth inquiry
into that position. Immigration was treated no differently than any other
area of administrative law, reinforcing the erosion of a theory of
immigration exceptionalism.
There is much, however, that the Supreme Court did not do in the
Martinez Gutierrez decision. The apparent simplicity of the Supreme
Court’s decision masks the actual complexity of a number of issues of
deference in these cases.158 Because the Court began and ended its
analysis with the question of whether the BIA’s interpretation was
reasonable, it necessarily did not address all relevant questions regarding
the Chevron analysis. First, it did not explicitly answer the question of
whether Chevron was the appropriate framework of deference to apply in
the first instance. This inquiry is sometimes called Chevron step zero. 159
At first, the answer here may appear self-evident, as the BIA was clearly
interpreting a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the
statute it was charged with administering.160 However, the Supreme Court
has held that Chevron still may not apply, depending on the formality of
the procedures used by the agency when distributing the interpretation.161
Amicus Curiae the National Immigration Justice Center (“NIJC”)
argued that the lesser Skidmore deference should have been applied in
Martinez Gutierrez instead. 162 Skidmore deference means essentially that
a court “accords an agency’s interpretation of a statute a certain amount
of respect or weight correlated with the strength of the agency’s
reasoning.”163 NIJC took the position that applying Chevron deference to
adjudicatory decisions of the BIA was not settled law and was not
appropriate for a number of reasons: the BIA makes rules with no public
removal, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 24, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/opinionanalysis-deferring-to-even-more-limited-relief-from-removal/ (“[T]he Court’s opinion reads as a run-ofthe-mill application of Chevron”).
158. Cf. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 1, Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (No. 10-1542) (“Lurking below the prominently
argued questions of statutory interpretation in this case are complicated questions of how deference to the
Board of Immigration Appeals ought to function.”).
159. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK.
L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
160. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516-17 (2009) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 424 (1999)).
161. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead
in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003).
162. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 158 at 13.
163. Jared P. Cole, An Introduction to Federal Judicial Review of Agency Action, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 15 (Dec. 7, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf. (citing Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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or stakeholder input, has comparatively limited subject matter expertise,
and has limited resources. 164 The Supreme Court did not address this
argument in its decision.
Perhaps more significantly, the Supreme Court did not take on the issue
of how to interpret the statute and determine whether the statutory
language was ambiguous at Chevron step one. The choice not to do so is
particularly interesting in a case with so many different positions with
respect to the “clear” meaning of the statute. Both the Attorney General
and Appellee Sawyers would have resolved the case at Chevron step one.
The Attorney General argued that the statute unambiguously prohibited
imputation of a parent’s residence and lawful permanent residence. 165
Sawyers argued the exact opposite: the statute unambiguously required
imputation. 166 Only Martinez Gutierrez (in apparent agreement with the
Ninth Circuit) found the statute ambiguous at Chevron step one. 167 The
parties considered a number of substantial questions in their Chevron step
one analysis: How should the plain text of the statute be interpreted? If
the plain language of the statute is silent on a particular point, does that
by definition make the statute ambiguous? How significant of a role
should legislative history play in interpreting the statute? What about
statutory context, including prior judicial interpretations of the same or
similar language?
In addition, the Supreme Court chose not to address the Brand X issues
raised by the Ninth Circuit in its decision in Mercado-Zazueta168 and by
Amicus NIJC in its brief in the instant case. 169 National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services 170 (“Brand
X”) is a Supreme Court decision that the BIA has interpreted as allowing
it to overrule prior circuit court decisions interpreting an ambiguous
statute.171 In the instant case, the BIA rejected the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, purportedly under the authority of Brand
X.172
164. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 158, at 13-25.
165. Brief for Petitioner at 33, Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) (No. 10-1542).
166. Brief for Respondent Damen Antonio Sawyers at 37-38, Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583
(No. 10-1542).
167. Brief for Respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez at 19-29, Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583
(No. 10-1542) (citing Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102, 1106-12 (9th Cir. 2009)).
168. Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1113-15.
169. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
supra note 158, at 7-13.
170. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
171. See, e.g., Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I&N Dec. 599, 600-01 (2008); see also Brief of the
National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 158, at n.1,
n.2.
172. Matter of Sawyers (2007); File: A44 852 478, 2007 WL 4711443 (BIA Dec. 26, 2007).
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The Supreme Court’s choice not to address the Brand X issue made its
opinion considerably more straightforward than the Ninth Circuit’s
complex and convoluted decision in Mercado-Zazueta.173 It also had the
effect of allowing the Supreme Court to make a more broadly applicable
statement with respect to the BIA’s position on the imputation of a
parent’s continuous residence and lawful permanent residence for
purposes of cancellation of removal. By ignoring the tug of war between
the BIA and the Ninth Circuit, the Court’s decision also resolved the
questions of imputation for cases in other circuits. However, as NIJC
argued, these considerations meant that Brand X questions will
perpetually evade Supreme Court review. 174
2. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio was heard by the Supreme Court in the
October 2013 term, two terms after Martinez-Gutierrez. The case turned
on the BIA’s interpretation of INA § 203(h)(3), a provision of the Child
Status Protection Act.175 INA § 203(h)(3) provides that, where a
noncitizen beneficiary is over 21 years of age and has aged out, “the
alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate
category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon
receipt of the original petition.”176 In a case called Matter of Wang, the
BIA held that this provision applied only to cases where the petitioner
remained the same. 177 That is, a petition for the child of a lawful
permanent resident who aged out of the F2A category (spouses and minor
children of lawful permanent residents) would automatically convert to a
petition in the F2B category (unmarried sons and daughters of lawful
permanent residents) and would retain the priority date of the original
F2A petition. 178 The beneficiary in Wang was originally a derivative
beneficiary on a fourth preference I-130 filed for her father by his United
States citizen sister.179 When the beneficiary aged out and was unable to
immigrate with her father to the United States, her lawful permanent
resident father filed for her on a second (F2B) preference I-130 and sought

173. See, e.g., Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1113-1115.
174. See Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 158 at 12 (“In any agency case that comes to the Court, it will analyze the agency
action under the Chevron test, and Brand X issues would become irrelevant by virtue of the grant of
certiorari.”).
175. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
176. INA § 202(h)(3).
177. 25 I&N Dec. 28 (2009).
178. See, e.g., de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012).
179. Matter of Wang, 25 I&N Dec. at 29.
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to retain the priority date of the petition filed by his sister.180 The BIA
held that INA § 203(h) did not apply under these circumstances. 181
Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio and several other similarly situated
petitioners challenged the BIA’s interpretation. 182 Cuellar de Osorio was
petitioned for on a third preference (married daughter) I-130 by her
United States citizen mother.183 Her son was originally a derivative
beneficiary on this petition, but had aged out in the eight years it took for
the priority date to became current. 184 After immigrating to the United
States as a lawful permanent resident, Cuellar de Osorio filed a (F2B)
preference petition for her son as the unmarried adult child of an LPR. 185
She sought to retain the priority date from the original third preference
petition but United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”) refused, meaning that Cuellar de Osorio’s son had to wait
several additional years for an immigrant visa. 186 After Cuellar de Osorio
and the other similarly situated petitioners sued, the district court deferred
to the BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang and granted summary judgment
to USCIS.187
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately
reversed the district court and ruled against the BIA, holding at step one
of the Chevron analysis that the statute “unambiguously grants automatic
conversion and priority date retention to [all] aged-out derivative
beneficiaries.”188 The Supreme Court disagreed, siding with the BIA and
the district court.189 There was much divergence within the Court’s
decision with respect to both outcome and rationale; no one opinion won
over a majority of the Justices. Justice Kagan delivered the judgment of
the Court and authored a plurality opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg. 190 Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment that was joined by Justice Scalia.191 Justice Alito wrote his own
dissenting opinion.192 Finally, Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting
180. Id. at 29.
181. Id. at 39.
182. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010. The case began as two separate lawsuits, one a class action and
one with numerous individual named plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases on appeal, and
they remained consolidated before the Supreme Court. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct.
2191, 2202 (2014).
183. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1006.
189. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2196-97 (2014).
190. Id. at 2196-2213.
191. Id. at 2214-2216.
192. Id. at 2191 2216.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/6

24

Rodriguez: Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: Administrative Law in the Sup

2018]

IMMIGRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

239

opinion that was joined by Justice Breyer and joined except for a single
footnote by Justice Thomas. 193
As a baseline, all of the Justices agreed that Chevron deference was the
appropriate vehicle for the Court’s analysis. 194 Only Justice Kagan in her
plurality opinion explained, without extensive discussion, why Chevron
deference was appropriate. She stated briefly that it was because the BIA
was interpreting the immigration laws. 195 Interestingly, she invoked
immigration exceptionalism in support of this deference: “Indeed,
‘judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in
the immigration context,’ where decisions about a complex statutory
scheme often implicate foreign relations.”196 The concurring and
dissenting opinions essentially assumed the applicability of Chevron.197
In fact, none of the parties, amici, or lower court opinions questioned
the applicability of administrative law. Unlike in Martinez-Gutierrez, the
question of whether Chevron deference was the appropriate vehicle was
not raised. Only Cuellar de Osorio alluded briefly in a footnote to the
possible applicability of arbitrary and capricious review under Section
706(2)(A) of the APA, while stating that the outcome would be the
same. 198 USCIS and the Amici invoked Chevron deference with brief or
no discussion. 199
Despite agreeing to apply Chevron deference, the Justices did not
concur on what step of the Chevron analysis resolved the case or on how
to analyze each step. The majority of the Justices – Kagan, Ginsburg, and
Kennedy in the plurality opinion and Roberts and Scalia in the
concurrence – found the statute ambiguous at Chevron step one. 200 They
differed substantially, however, on how they reached this conclusion.
Justice Kagan for the plurality found the statute to be internally
contradictory, with the first clause pointing in favor of a broad
interpretation of the group benefitted but the second clause indicating a

193. Id. at 2216-2228.
194. Id. at 2213 (Kagan, J., plurality opinion), 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), 2216 (Alito, J.,
dissenting), 2217-2219 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2203.
196. Id. at 2203 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
197. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting), 2217-2219 (-Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
198. Brief for Respondents at 46, n.16, Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (No. 12-930) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966)).
199. Brief for the Petitioners at 15-19, Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (No. 12-930); Brief of
Current and Former Members of Congress as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13, Cuellar de
Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (No. 12-930); Brief of the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 24, Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (No. 12-930).
200. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2203-2212 (Kagan, J., plurality opinion), 2214-2216 (Robert,
C.J., concurrence).
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narrow one.201 In interpreting the statutory language, she relied on the
plain language of the statute, the statutory context (the meaning of the
same terms in other parts of the same Act), and the logical outcome of
each interpretation. 202 She held that, given this internal tension, it was
appropriate to defer to the BIA’s reasonable selection of which
interpretation to apply.
Justice Roberts in the concurrence was strongly critical of this
approach.203 While he still found the statute ambiguous, he did not do so
as a result of internal conflict within the statute. He emphasized that
Chevron was based on the premise that Congress intended to assign
responsibility to resolve an ambiguous provision to the agency but that
direct conflict was not ambiguity: “Chevron is not a license for an agency
to repair a statute that does not make sense.”204 This issue was avoided,
however, as Justice Roberts found that there was no internal conflict or
tension in INA § 203(h)(3) as it was possible (and required) to interpret
the provision as a coherent whole. 205 Focusing on the plain language of
the statute, he interpreted the first clause as stating a condition, rather than
as granting a benefit to a broad group as in the plurality opinion. 206 He
then relied on Congress’ silence with respect to which petitions can be
automatically converted in the second clause to find the provision
ambiguous.207
Because both the plurality and concurring opinions found that INA §
203(h)(3) was ambiguous at step one of the Chevron analysis, they moved
on to assessing the reasonableness of the BIA’s interpretation of it at
Chevron step two. Neither spent long on this portion of their analysis
before concluding that the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable. 208 For the
plurality, Justice Kagan held that “the Board chose a textually reasonable
construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies
underlying immigration law.”209 She thus focused on the consistency of
the BIA’s interpretation with the statutory language and on the policy
reasons advanced by the BIA. She also mentioned the greater
administrative simplicity of the BIA’s interpretation. 210
201. Id. at 2203-2205.
202. Id. at 2203-2212.
203. Id. at 2214.
204. Id. at 2214.
205. Id. at 2214 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
Justice Roberts did not discuss what he believed to be the appropriate approach in a case where such
internal tension actually existed.
206. Id. at 2214-15.
207. Id. at 2215.
208. Id. at 2212-13, 2215-16.
209. Id. at 2213.
210. Id. at 2212.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts relied on the “ordinary
meaning of the statutory terms,” the statutory context and meaning of the
statutory terms in other areas of immigration law, and “with the structure
of the family-based immigration system.”211 Like Justice Kagan, he also
highlighted the fact that the BIA’s interpretation avoided problems that
would come with the other proposed interpretations of the statute.
Both dissenting opinions, like the Ninth Circuit’s opinion being
reviewed, would have resolved the case at Chevron step one by finding
the language of the statute unambiguously applied to aged-out derivative
beneficiaries in all five family preference categories. 212 Justice Alito’s
dissent was brief, and focused on the fact that the mandatory word “shall”
appears twice in INA § 203(h)(3). 213 The heart of Justice Sotomayor’s
disagreement with respect to how the statute should be interpreted boils
down to this: “Because the Court and the BIA ignore obvious ways in
which [INA § 203](h)(3) can operate as a coherent whole and instead
construe the statute as a self-contradiction that was broken from the
moment Congress wrote it, I respectfully dissent.” 214 Justice Sotomayor,
in interpreting the statutory language, repeated that she was using
traditional tools of statutory construction to interpret INA § 203(h)(3),
including looking at compatibility with the rest of the law.215
As in Martinez-Gutierrez, the uncontroversial invocation of Chevron
deference is significant in that it demonstrates that the Court was not
hesitant to apply ordinary administrative law principles in the
“exceptional” immigration context.216 While the Court did again
ultimately defer to the agency’s construction of the statute, it did so only
after an in-depth inquiry into the BIA’s position. Immigration was treated
no differently than any other area of administrative law, again reinforcing
the erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism.
Cuellar de Osorio differs from Martinez-Gutierrez, however, in the
apparent difficulty the Justices had in reaching agreement on any one
approach or outcome. The members of the Court that heard the two cases
were the same; there had been no change in the composition of the Court
between Martinez-Gutierrez and Cuellar de Osorio.217 So what explains
the radically greater divergence in opinions in Cuellar de Osorio?
211. Id. at 2215.
212. Id. at 2216-17.
213. Id. at 2216.
214. Id. at 2217.
215. Id. at 2228.
216. See Kevin Johnson, Opinion analysis: Another stop at the Chevron station and deference to
the BIA, SCOTUSBLOG (June 9, 2014, 3:26 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-analysisanother-stop-at-the-chevron-station-and-deference-to-the-bia/.
217. See Justices: Current Members, S UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ABOUT THE
COURT, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 18, 2017).
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One possibility is the fact that Martinez-Gutierrez focused primarily on
Chevron step two, while the controversy in Cuellar de Osorio was
centered on the meaning of the statutory language at Chevron step one.
The disagreement in Cuellar de Osorio, then, was the Court’s relatively
standard disagreement with respect to how statutes should be interpreted
and the role of these principles of statutory interpretation in the Chevron
analysis. 218 In addition to the usual Chevron step one questions
highlighted in the discussion of Martinez-Gutierrez, Cuellar de Osorio
added an additional question: How should potentially conflicting or
contradictory statutory language be interpreted? 219 There was some
recognition of this meta-debate regarding the role of statutory
interpretation at Chevron step one within the opinions in Cuellar de
Osorio, although for the most part the Justices were simply engaged in
the interpretation without discussing the theory of it. 220
Another layer of interpretation of the divergence of opinions in Cuellar
de Osorio is that this was the beginning of the next step of the erosion of
a theory of immigration exceptionalism. While courts have increasingly
begun to invoke ordinary principles of administrative (and constitutional)
law in immigration cases, these theories are sometimes applied at a very
surface level with little recognition or real analysis of the troubling
questions inherent in the doctrines. 221 The Justices in Cuellar de Osorio
began to grapple with the deeper questions and issues that remain
particularly unresolved in the immigration context. As a result, new areas
of disagreement were revealed.
3. Mellouli v. Lynch
Mellouli v. Lynch was heard by the Supreme Court during the October
2014 term, just one term after Cuellar de Osorio.222 The case turned on
the BIA’s interpretation of the controlled substance ground of
deportability, which provides: “Any alien who at any time after admission
has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State .
. . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the
Controlled Substances Act . . .) . . . is deportable.”223 Mellouli was
convicted of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, in his case a
sock used to store a controlled substance, in violation of a Kansas
218. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teaches Us About the Rest of Statutory
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607 (2014).
219. See supra Part II.A.2.
220. See, e.g., Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2207, 2213, 2214, 2216, 2217, 2220.
221. Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez, Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of
212(c) and 212(h) Waivers, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 111, 114, 196-201 (2017).
222. Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015); Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2203.
223. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i); see also Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1984-85.
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statute.224 The question at issue was whether this conviction fell within
the controlled substance ground of deportability. 225 The BIA held that it
did, and the Eighth Circuit deferred to this interpretation as reasonable. 226
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the BIA’s interpretation was
not reasonable. 227 Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Court. 228
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice
Alito.229
The Supreme Court clearly applied ordinary principles of
administrative law, specifically Chevron deference (as did the Eighth
Circuit). 230 Furthermore, unlike in Martinez-Gutierrez and Cuellar de
Osorio, the Supreme Court applied those principles to overturn the
agency’s decision, finding it unreasonable, instead of to defer to it. This
is further evidence of the erosion of a theory of immigration
exceptionalism. 231
However, the Supreme Court’s invocation of Chevron may raise more
questions than it answers. The two-step Chevron analysis was not used as
an overarching framework for the Court’s decision. The same was
essentially true of the Eighth Circuit decision the Supreme Court was
reviewing and of the parties’ merits briefs before the Supreme Court. 232
None of the Amici Curiae so much as reference Chevron in their briefs.
Chevron was, however, raised by the Justices several times during oral
argument, both with Mellouli’s counsel and government counsel. 233
Chevron was referenced exactly once in the Supreme Court’s opinion,
in the Court’s description of its conclusion that the BIA’s position was
unreasonable: “Because it makes scant sense, the BIA’s interpretation, we
hold, is owed no deference under the doctrine described in Chevron . . .
.”234 The Court’s opinion was comparatively brief, and focused primarily
on the particulars of the case rather than on any overarching legal

224. Id. at 1985.
225. Id. at 1984.
226. Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995, 998-1000 (8th Cir. 2013).
227. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1989.
228. Id. at 1983-91.
229. Id. at 1991-95.
230. Id. at 1989; Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000.
231. For a different interpretation of the invocation of Chevron in Mellouli, see Patrick Glen,
Response to Walker on Chevron Deference and Mellouli v. Lynch, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(June 10, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/response-to-walker-on-chevron-deference-and-mellouli-v-lynchby-patrick-glen/ (taking the position that Chevron was a strawman, “brought out to the scaffold only to be
summarily executed on the Court’s path to an interpretation of the statute it prefers.”)
232. Mellouli, 719 F.3d at 1000.
233. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, 30-31, 44, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034).
234. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1989 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
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theory.235 Justice Thomas’ dissent did not mention Chevron or deference
at all, even to discuss whether or not they are applicable. 236 It treated the
case as a question purely of statutory interpretation. 237
The first, and perhaps most significant for this case, question left
unanswered by the Court’s opinion was whether Chevron was applicable
at all.238 In his initial merits brief to the Court, Mellouli argued “[t]here is
no place for Chevron deference in this case.”239 He stated briefly that the
Court in the past had determined for itself “the elements that Congress
requires for immigration consequences to attach to a conviction for
purposes of categorical analysis,” rather than deferring to the BIA’s
determination, but did not offer any kind of rationale or explanation for
this phenomenon. 240 Mellouli expanded somewhat on this issue in a
footnote in his reply brief, explaining that the terms being interpreted have
“criminal implications.”241 The Attorney General, on the other hand,
argued that Chevron deference was appropriate because the BIA was
interpreting the immigration laws, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cuellar de Osorio, among other cases.242 He conceded that deference
was not due to the BIA’s interpretation of purely criminal statutes, but
argued that this exception did not apply in the situation at hand, where the
BIA was using “the ‘categorical approach’ to determine if a state crime
met a federal statutory definition.”243 As discussed further below in
section III.B.1, this is an important area in substantial need of clarification
from the Supreme Court.
235. See also Kevin Johnson, Opinion analysis: Court rejects removal based on misdemeanor drug
paraphernalia
conviction,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
1,
2015,
1:42
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-court-rejects-removal-based-on-misdemeanordrug- paraphernalia-conviction/ (“Today’s decision is a typical statutory interpretation and agency
deference case, which would not seem to have many far-reaching doctrinal implications.”).
236. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991-95.
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Argument preview: Removal for a misdemeanor “drug
paraphernalia”
conviction,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan.
2,
2015,
3:28
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/argument-preview-removal-for-a-misdemeanor-drugparaphernalia-conviction/ (“Indeed, the argument has been made that Chevron deference is not justified
in instances like this one given that the BIA’s expertise is in immigration, not criminal, law.”).
239. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 11, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034).
240. Id. at 35 (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 189-93 (2013); Kawashima v. Holder,
565 U.S. 478, 481-84 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573-74 (2010); Nijhawan v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33-34 (2009); Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007); Lopez v,
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 48 (2010); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)). Mellouli also argues in the
alternative that the Congressional language was unambiguous or that the BIA’s position was
unreasonable. Id. at 35-42.
241. Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits at 19 n.6, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034) (citing
Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014) (“The critical point is that criminal laws are for
courts, not for the Government, to construe.”)).
242. Brief for the Respondent at 45, Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (No. 13-1034).
243. Id at 45-48.
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The Court furthermore did not address additional questions on the
application of the two steps of the Chevron analysis. First, the Court did
not specify whether it was resolving the case at Chevron step one or
Chevron step two.244 Because the Court highlighted the “scant sense” of
the BIA’s interpretation, it would appear that they were reviewing the
reasonableness of the agency’s position at step two. If this is the case,
however, the Court did not address step one at all; there was no discussion
whatsoever of whether Congress had spoken clearly. The opinion,
therefore, provides no guidance on how to apply the traditional tools of
statutory construction and interpret a statute as part of Chevron step one.
The Court did address step two, but only in application. Before
concluding that the BIA’s position was unreasonable, the Court discussed
in particular the consistency of the BIA’s position with the language of
the statute, the history of the interpretation of this provision, and the fit of
the BIA’s interpretation within the overall statutory scheme. 245
Presumably, then, these are among the factors that should be considered
in assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s position. The Court’s
opinion provided only the most limited guidance on this point, however,
as the Court never stated this explicitly, much less explored their
comparative importance or the relevance of other factors.
Furthermore, there is an analytical problem if the Court is in fact
resolving the case at Chevron’s step two. Normally, where a statute is
ambiguous but the agency’s interpretation is unreasonable, the
appropriate action for a reviewing court is to reverse and remand the case
to the agency for it to issue a new decision. 246 Instead of doing so here,
however, the Court’s opinion can be read as reaching its own
interpretation of the statute. 247 This would make the Court’s opinion
somewhat internally contradictory – the statute is ambiguous for purposes
of Chevron step one, but clear for purposes of the Court’s own
interpretation. The Court says nothing to resolve this apparent tension.
4. Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions
In the October 2016 term, the Supreme Court heard a case that
squarely presented the opportunity for the Court to answer many of the
unanswered, and unacknowledged, questions regarding the role of
administrative law within the immigration context: Esquivel Quintana v.

244. See Christopher Walker, The “Scant Sense” Exception to Chevron Deference in Mellouli v.
Lynch, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 2, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-scant-senseexception-to-chevron-deference-in-mellouli-v-lynch-by-chris-walker/.
245. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986-89.
246. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
247. Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991. See Glen, supra note 231.
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Sessions.248 Juan Esquivel Quintana was convicted under California Penal
Code § 261.5 for having consensual sex with his 16-year-old girlfriend
when he was 20. The Court considered whether this conviction
constituted an aggravated felony, specifically sexual abuse of a minor
under INA § 101(a)(43)(A).
The BIA held that “sexual abuse of a minor” in INA § 101(a)(43)(A)
categorically encompassed convictions under California Penal Code §
261.5.249 The Sixth Circuit applied Chevron deference and found that INA
§ 101(a)(43)(A) was ambiguous but that the BIA’s interpretation was
reasonable. 250 The Sixth Circuit addressed the Chevron step zero
question, beginning its analysis with the broad statement: “The Supreme
Court and Sixth Circuit have repeatedly held that Chevron deference
applies to the Board's interpretations of immigration laws.”251 The Sixth
Circuit then noted that at least three other circuit courts had applied
Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor, 252 while
at least two other circuit courts had not. 253 Finally, the Sixth Circuit
rejected arguments that Chevron deference should be supplanted, either
due to the fact that this was a criminal hybrid statute or to the fact that the
rule of lenity should apply. 254
In his brief before the Supreme Court, Esquivel Quintana simply
applied the Chevron analysis without briefing the question of Chevron’s
applicability. However, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (“NACDL”), as amicus curiae in support of Esquivel Quintana,
considered at length the question of whether Chevron was applicable
under these circumstances, ultimately concluding that it was not. NACDL
argued first that Chevron deference should not be afforded to BIA
interpretations of aggravated felony provisions because of the criminal
law implications of those provisions. 255 They advocated for the

248. Esquivel Quintana v. Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016); see also Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/esquivel-quintana-v-lynch/ (last visited May
18, 2017).
249. Esquivel Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1024-27 (6th Cir. 2016).
250. Id..
251. Id. at 1021-22 (citing Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203, 2214 (2014));
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516-17 (2009); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999);
Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2010); Singh v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 400, 403 (6th Cir.
2006)).
252. Id. at 1022 (citing Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); Restrepo v.
Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 796 (3d Cir. 2010); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2001)).
253. Id. at 1021-22 (citing Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 518-20 (4th Cir. 2015); Estrada- Espinoza
v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1156-58 (9th Cir. 2008)).
254. Id. at 1022-24.
255. Brief of the Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 6-12, Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016) (No. 16-54).
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application of the rule of lenity in Chevron’s stead. 256 In the alternative,
NACDL argued that, even if the Chevron framework was applicable,
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor” was
not warranted because the BIA had no criminal law expertise and their
interpretation would harm criminal defense attorneys. 257 The government
contended that Chevron deference was applicable in a brief argument that
essentially mirrored the Sixth Circuit’s decision. 258 As discussed below,
the Supreme Court appeared to be concerned with Chevron’s
applicability, raising this issue during oral argument. 259
As for Chevron steps one and two, Esquivel Quintana took the position
that “sexual abuse of a minor” under INA § 101(a)(43)(A) unambiguously
excluded his conviction. He explained that a statute could not be termed
ambiguous until all tools of statutory interpretation, including the
categorical approach, had been exhausted. 260 After applying the
categorical approach, looking at the plain language and context of the
statute, construing any ambiguities in favor of the noncitizen, and
applying the rule of lenity, he concluded that “sexual abuse of a minor”
did not include consensual sex between a 20-year-old and someone who
was almost 18. 261 Alternatively, Esquivel Quintana argued that the BIA’s
interpretation of the phrase was unreasonable because the BIA erred
legally in three ways: the BIA was functionally arguing against the
categorical approach, the BIA sought guidance to interpret “criminal
abuse of a minor” from noncriminal sources, and the BIA should have, at
a minimum, applied the principle interpreting deportation narrowly and
the criminal rule of lenity. 262
The government, on the other hand, appears to have argued that “sexual
abuse of a minor” unambiguously included convictions such as Esquivel
Quintana’s or, in the alternative, that the BIA’s interpretation of
California Penal Code § 261.5 to include such convictions was
reasonable. 263 The government viewed the relationship between the
categorical approach and Chevron deference very differently than
Esquivel Quintana. Instead of arguing that the categorical approach
should be part of the analysis of the statute at Chevron step one, the
government argued that Chevron deference should be part of the first step

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 12-19.
Id. At 19-24.
Brief for the Respondent at 36-38, Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-54).
Transcript of Oral Argument, Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-54).
Brief for the Petitioner at 35-45, Esquivel Quintana, 137 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-54).
Id.
Id. at 45-48.
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 258..
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of the categorical approach.264 The government also argued that the rule
of lenity should not be triggered until all tools of statutory interpretation,
including deference, have been employed. 265
The Supreme Court appeared to be concerned with the role and
application of Chevron deference during oral argument.266 With respect
to the applicability of Chevron deference, Justice Alito asked Esquivel
Quintana’s counsel whether he was asking for Chevron to be
overturned; 267 Justice Kennedy asked why the BIA had any expertise
interpreting criminal statutes; 268 and Justice Kagan proposed an exception
to Chevron deference where criminal law came into play. 269 Justices
Breyer and Roberts also discussed the interplay between immigration and
criminal law and the implications for Chevron.270
Given the depth at which these issues of administrative law were
addressed, both in the briefs and during oral argument, it seemed
reasonable to expect that the Supreme Court would take this opportunity
to resolve at least some of the unanswered and unacknowledged questions
with respect to the role of administrative law in the immigration context.
However, the Court ultimately failed to do so. In an opinion issued on
May 30, 2017, the Court reversed the BIA and the Sixth Circuit, holding
that a conviction under California Penal Code § 261.5 was not an
aggravated felony because the California statute did not categorically fall
within the definition of “sexual abuse of a minor.” 271 Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by all of the other Justices with
the exception of Justice Gorsuch, who was not yet part of the Court at the
time the case was argued.272
The majority of the Court’s decision focused on the analysis of whether
the relevant California statute was categorically a sexual abuse of a minor
aggravated felony. 273 The Court only mentioned Chevron, or any kind of
deference, in the last, very brief, section of its decision. 274 The Court
stated: “We have no need to resolve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron

264. Id. at 36-55.
265. Id. at 12-13.
266. See also, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Argument analysis: Justices divided on meaning of “sexual
abuse of a minor” for removal purposes, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2017, 8:10 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/02/argument-analysis-justices-divided-meaning-sexual-abuse-minorremoval- purposes/.
267. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 259, at 6.
268. Id. at 38-39.
269. See generally id.
270. Id.
271. Esquivel Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572-73 (2017).
272. Id. at 1567.
273. Id. at 1567-73.
274. Id. at 1572.
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receives priority in this case because the statute, read in context,
unambiguously forecloses the Board’s interpretation. Therefore, neither
the rule of lenity nor Chevron applies.”275 This could be read as a Chevron
step one decision, a holding at step one of the Chevron framework that
Congress had spoken clearly such that there was no room for agency
interpretation. However, the Court also stated that the Chevron
framework did not apply. This part of the Court’s conclusion seems more
like a Chevron step zero analysis. The Court did not explain its conclusion
or the basis for it any further. Rather than clarifying the role and
application of Chevron deference in immigration cases or in specific types
of immigration cases, then, the Court’s decision in Esquivel Quintana
only further confuses it.
B. Agency Policymaking – Arbitrary and Capricious Review
The Supreme Court invoked arbitrary and capricious review in just a
single case between 2010 and 2016: Judulang v. Holder, decided by the
Court on December 12, 2011.276 Arbitrary and capricious review comes
from Section 706(2)(A) of the APA, which provides that a “reviewing
court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 277 It is typically triggered by
agency policymaking, rather than the agency legal conclusions that
trigger Chevron deference. 278Judulang was heard in the same term as the
first Chevron case discussed above – Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez – but
was decided before arguments in Martinez-Gutierrez were heard.279 The
Court ruled in favor of Judulang, overturning the agency’s action.
1. Judulang v. Holder
Joel Judulang’s case turned on the BIA’s interpretation of who
remained eligible for relief from removal under the former section 212(c)
of the INA. 280 The history of the case and its place and significance among
the 212(c) decisions was explained at length in my prior article,
Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of 212(c) and
212(h) Waivers.281 In brief, INA § 212(c) has a complex and heavily
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A
NUTSHELL 102-107 (5th ed. 2006).
279. Judulang, 565 U.S. 42; Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012).
280. Judulang, 565 U.S. 42.
281. Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 165-69.
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litigated legal history in multiple respects. 282 It is a waiver of
inadmissibility in Section 212 of the INA, but has been expanded through
a series of court decisions to also apply to certain noncitizens charged as
deportable. 283 It was repealed by the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) in 1996, 284 but the Supreme
Court held that it must remain retroactively available to noncitizens who
were convicted prior to the date of repeal. 285 A final regulation meant to
implement these decisions was promulgated in 2004.286 The regulations
provided that, in order to be eligible for 212(c) relief, the charged ground
of deportability must have a statutory counterpart in the grounds of
inadmissibility in the INA. 287
Judulang was charged as deportable for an aggravated felony crime of
violence because of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. 288 The
BIA found that he was not eligible for 212(c) relief because, it held,
aggravated felony crimes of violence did not have a substantially similar
statutory counterpart in the grounds of inadmissibility.289 The Ninth
Circuit agreed in an unpublished and brief decision, relying on one of its
prior decisions as controlling. 290 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Judulang
did not mention Chevron or any other form of deference to the agency’s
interpretation.291 The prior decision that it relied on – Abebe v. Gonzales
– applied Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of INA § 212(c),
holding that Congress had not spoken clearly but the BIA’s interpretation
was reasonable. 292
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit with respect to
both substance and framework, rejecting Chevron deference and instead
finding the BIA’s approach to be arbitrary and capricious in violation of

282. See, e.g., id. at 122-71; Patrick Glen, Judulang v. Holder and the Future of 212(c) Relief, 27
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6-15 (2013); 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 74.04(2)(a) (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016);
283. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 122-71; Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA
2014).
284. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597 (1996).
285. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-326 (2001); Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012); Matter
of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. at 268-69.
286. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) (2005).
287. 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5).
288. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 51-52 (2011).
289. Judulang v. Gonzales, 249 Fed. App’x 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd and remanded, 565 U.S.
42.
290. Id. (citing Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007)). The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent
decisions in the Abebe litigation occurred after this decision in Judulang. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 577
F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009).
291. See Judulang, 249 Fed. App’x at 502.
292. Id. at 502; Abebe, 493 F.3d 1092.
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Section 706(2)(A) of the APA.293 Justice Kagan again delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court. 294 Like many of the Chevron cases
previously discussed, the Court’s opinion in Judulang reads like a
straightforward, ordinary application of administrative law principles.
The applicability of administrative law in the first instance, or its
interpretation particular to the immigration context, were not contested or
questioned.
The Supreme Court explained that, in order to survive arbitrary and
capricious review, an agency must provide a reasoned explanation, based
on “non-arbitrary, ‘relevant factors’” for its choices when setting
policy.295 In the immigration context, this means “that the BIA's approach
must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the immigration laws or
the appropriate operation of the immigration system.”296 The Supreme
Court held that the BIA’s approach failed this test: “Rather than
considering factors that might be thought germane to the deportation
decision, that policy hinges § 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant
comparison between statutory provisions.” 297 Again, this straightforward
application of administrative law is further evidence of the erosion of
immigration exceptionalism. As in the previous cases, however, there are
gaps in the Court’s treatment of these administrative law issues.
First, the Supreme Court’s choice of which administrative law
framework to apply was in some respects remarkable. Neither the Ninth
Circuit in the opinion being reviewed nor the numerous other major
decisions reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of who was eligible for
212(c) relief had so much as considered arbitrary and capricious
review. 298 Judulang in his initial brief argued his case under the APA
arbitrary and capricious framework. 299 He failed to explain, however, why
this approach was more appropriate than the Chevron deference relied on
by the Ninth Circuit. The Attorney General, on the other hand, argued the
case under Chevron deference without addressing the use of the arbitrary
and capricious framework.300 None of the amicus briefs addressed this
293. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52-53 n.7.
294. Id. at 45.
295. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 55 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 128-71.
299. Brief for Petitioner at 31-55, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Judulang’s petition for
certiorari proceeded in the same manner, arguing that the BIA’s interpretation was arbitrary and capricious
in violation of the APA, without discussing why this framework should have been substituted for the
Chevron deference employed by the Ninth Circuit. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, 26, Judulang, 565
U.S. 42 (No. 10-694).
300. Brief for Respondent at 18-30, Judulang, 565 U.S. 42 (No. 10-694). Specifically, the Attorney
General argued that the statutory language of INA § 212(c) was ambiguous at Chevron step one and the
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choice between administrative law frameworks. It is somewhat surprising
to see such a major shift in approach receive such little discussion and
analysis.
Setting aside the jarring nature of the switch, however, in substance it
was at a minimum justifiable as a logical and legally sound change. In a
footnote, the Court explained that the agency was not interpreting a statute
Congress had charged it with administering and, therefore, Chevron
deference was not triggered. 301 INA § 212(c) did not even mention
grounds of deportation, so it was a stretch to consider the BIA’s
comparable-grounds rule to be a statutory interpretation. 302 As a general
rule, however, there is no bright line between legal interpretations and
agency policymaking, and it can be challenging to determine how to
classify individual agency actions. The Supreme Court in Judulang did
not provide guidance on how to make this determination moving forward,
even though such guidance might have been expected given the change
in analytical framework.
Second, both Judulang303 and the Court304 acknowledged that both the
analysis and the result of arbitrary and capricious review would be the
same as reviewing the reasonableness of the BIA’s position under step
two of Chevron.305 This means that the choice of framework likely had
little effect on the outcome. This parallel has potentially significant
implications for administrative law, but was not explored further by the
Court.
III. TESTING THE THEORY – IS IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM REALLY
BEING ERODED?
In the October 2010 to October 2016 terms, the Supreme Court issued
the seven immigration decisions discussed above in Sections I and II, that
included reference to ordinary principles of administrative law. 306 Over
BIA’s reasonable interpretation of that language was entitled to deference at Chevron step two. Id. at 1820.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 299, at 44 n.16 (citing Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research
v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)) (“Whether understood under the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), or under the second step of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984), the standard is the same: whether the BIA’s policy is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”).
304. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52 n.7 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)) (“Were we to do so, our analysis would be the same, because under
Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”).
305. See also Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 166-69, 196-202.
306. This works out to an average of one case per term. In fact, however, three of the cases were
decided in the October 2014 term, and none of the cases were heard in the October 2010 term. Although
no substantive decision was issued as a result of a tie vote, the Supreme Court did consider United States

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/6

38

Rodriguez: Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: Administrative Law in the Sup

2018]

IMMIGRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

253

the same period of time (the October 2010 to October 2016 terms), the
Supreme Court released four additional immigration opinions that did not
mention administrative law despite its at least arguable applicability.
Three of these cases – Kawashima v. Holder,307 Moncrieffe v. Holder,308
and Luna Torres v. Lynch309 – dealt with various aggravated felony
grounds for removal. A fourth case, Vartelas v. Holder, considered the
retroactive application of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act’s new definition of admission. 310
The fact that the Supreme Court did not apply ordinary principles of
administrative law in these cases does not automatically counter the
erosion of the theory of immigration exceptionalism discussed above in
Sections I and II. In some respects, these cases may be taken as further
supporting the erosion of immigration exceptionalism. In other respects,
however, these cases highlight the slow and uneven nature of this erosion.
Many of the same, and some new, unanswered questions with respect to
the role of administrative law in immigration cases are evident. The fact
that the Supreme Court failed to discuss why it was not applying arguably
relevant principles of administrative law is particularly problematic.
Section III.A below discusses those Supreme Court immigration
opinions that did not invoke administrative law and the potentially
applicable administrative law questions that were not addressed. Section
III.B summarizes the themes and remaining questions from all of the
Supreme Court immigration cases discussed in this article, both those that
did and those that did not invoke administrative law. Section III.C is
forward looking. It considers the Supreme Court’s opportunity through
various cases in the October 2017 term, including the cases challenging
Trump’s entry ban, to confront some of the unanswered and
unacknowledged questions.
A. Administrative Law Not Invoked
The Supreme Court heard four immigration cases from the October
2010 through the October 2016 terms where administrative law principles
were at least arguably applicable but were not discussed in the Supreme
Court’s decisions. In all but one of these cases, administrative law
principles were squarely before the Court, either because they were raised
by the lower courts or because they were argued by the parties or amici
v. Texas in the October 2015 term, which involved substantial immigration and administrative law issues.
See United States v. Texas, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/united-states-vtexas/.
307. 565 U.S. 478 (2012).
308. 569 U.S. 184 (2013).
309. 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016).
310. 566 U.S. 257 (2012).
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curiae. The exception is Moncrieffe v. Holder, where neither the Fifth
Circuit nor the parties nor the amici curiae raised administrative law
arguments. 311
Three of the cases – Kawashima v. Holder,312 Moncrieffe v. Holder,313
and Luna Torres v. Lynch314 – concerned noncitizens removable for
aggravated felony convictions and involved similar themes. Section
III.A.1 discusses these cases. The fourth case, Vartelas v. Holder,315
involved a lawful permanent resident who took a brief trip abroad and
was charged as inadmissible upon his return because of the new definition
of admission in INA § 101(a)(13)(C). Section III.A.2 discusses this case.
1. Aggravated Felonies – Kawashima, Moncrieffe, and Luna Torres
Kawashima v. Holder,316 Moncrieffe v. Holder,317 and Luna Torres v.
Lynch318 all dealt with interpretations of the definition of “aggravated
felonies” in INA § 101(a)(43). A conviction for an aggravated felony at
any time after admission makes a noncitizen deportable pursuant to INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). It will also bar eligibility for certain immigration
benefits and forms of relief from removal. 319
Kawashima was heard by the Supreme Court in the October 2011 term,
along with Vartelas, discussed in more detail below in Section III.B.2,
and Martinez Gutierrez and Judulang, which were discussed above in
Section II. In Kawashima, the Supreme Court held that a conviction for
filing a false tax return was an offense involving fraud or deceit within
the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i).320 Moncrieffe was heard the year
after Kawashima, in the October 2012 term. The Court in Moncrieffe held
that a Georgia conviction for possession with intent to distribute was not
a drug trafficking crime within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(B). 321 In
so holding, the Court in Moncrieffe confirmed the use of the categorical
approach, which requires a court to determine that all conduct
criminalized under a statute fits within the criminal removal ground to

311. See
Moncrieffe
v.
Holder,
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/moncrieffe-v-holder/.
312. 565 U.S. 478 (2012).
313. 569 U.S. 184 (2013).
314. 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016).
315. 566 U.S. 257 (2012).
316. 565 U.S. 478.
317. 569 U.S. 184.
318. 136 S. Ct. 1619).
319. See, e.g., INA § 240A(a) (LPR cancellation of removal); INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)(i)
(asylum).
320. See generally 565 U.S. 478.
321. See generally 569 U.S. 184.
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find a noncitizen removable. 322 Luna Torres was decided most recently,
in the October 2015 term. 323 The Court in Luna Torres held that a New
York conviction for attempted arson was an offense described in the
federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844, when the New York statute
matched all elements of the federal statute except the jurisdictional
interstate commerce element.324
The Second Circuit in Luna Torres and the parties’ merits briefs before
the Supreme Court in both Luna Torres and Kawashima engaged in the
Chevron two-step analysis. 325 The lower court decisions in Kawashima
(Ninth Circuit) and Moncrieffe (Fifth Circuit) and the parties in
Moncrieffe did not.326 The Supreme Court opinions in all three cases did
not follow the Chevron framework. In fact, they did not mention Chevron,
even to explain why it did not apply. Furthermore, they did not discuss
any other type of deference to the agency, or for that matter any aspect of
administrative law.
Why was the Supreme Court silent on the question of Chevron
deference in these three cases? And what explains the difference between
these cases and the Supreme Court’s decision in Mellouli, which
referenced Chevron, albeit obliquely? It is of course difficult to extract
meaning from the Supreme Court’s silence, but there are at least several
possible explanations.
First, some advocates and commentators have suggested a “Chevron
Step Zero” type argument that deference to the BIA is not appropriate
where the BIA is interpreting statutes or terms that also have meaning in
the criminal context rather than the purely immigration statutes it is
charged with administering. 327 This is true of the term “aggravated
felony,” which also plays a role in the context of the sentencing guidelines
and is therefore being interpreted simultaneously by the federal courts. 328
322. Id.
323. 136 S. Ct. 1619.
324. See generally id.
325. Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152, 156-58 (2d Cir. 2014); Brief for the Petitioner at 38-49, Luna
Torres, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (No. 14-1096); Brief for the Respondent at 45-56, Luna Torres, 136 S. Ct. 1619
(No. 14-1096); Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Kawashima, 565 U.S. 478 (No. 10-577); Brief for the
Respondent at 16, 41 n.17, 43, Kawashima, 565 U.S. 478 (No. 10-577).
326. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2011); Brief for the Petitioner, Moncrieffe,
569 U.S. 184 (No. 11-702); Brief for the Respondent, Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. 184 (No. 11-702); Kawashima
v. Holder, 615 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010).
327. See, e.g., Katherine Brady, Who Decides? Overview of Chevron, Brand X and Mead
Principles,
IMMIGRATION
LEGAL
RESOURCE
CENTER
(May
2,
2011),,
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/overview_of_chevron_mead__brand_x.pdf. A broader
version of this argument – that Chevron deference to the BIA is never appropriate – was voiced by amicus
curiae National Immigration Justice Center in their brief in support of Respondent in Holder v. Martinez
Gutierrez. Brief of the Nat’l Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
13, Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) (No. 10-1542).
328. See Brady, supra note 327, at 4 n. 13.
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This could explain why the Supreme Court referenced deference in
Mellouli, where it was confronted with a criminal ground of removability
that was not an aggravated felony, and did not reference deference in
Kawashima, Moncrieffe, and Luna Torres, where it was concerned with
various aggravated felonies. However, the statute at issue in Mellouli also
contained a reference to a criminal statute – the Controlled Substances
Act – which complicates this hypothesis. Overlap between criminal and
immigration statutes is common, and accepting this hypothesis could lead
to a “confusing patchwork” of situations where deference is and is not
applied. 329
Alternatively, the Supreme Court simply may not be ready to make a
definitive statement on this question.330 There may be too much
disagreement among the Justices to craft a coherent decision, or the
Justices may still be forming their opinion on the question. As a result,
they are muddling through on a case-by-case basis and avoiding the
question when possible.
Finally, the explanation may lie in the Chevron doctrine itself.331 The
Supreme Court may see Chevron as a more flexible doctrine than its
relatively rigid analytical structure would suggest. A more flexible
doctrine would allow the Court to determine whether Chevron deference
is appropriate on a case-by-case basis. It has even been suggested that the
Chevron doctrine is in decline. 332 This may cause the Court to hesitate in
invoking it.
2. Vartelas v. Holder
Vartelas v. Holder was decided by the Supreme Court in its October
2011 term, along with Kawashima, Martinez Gutierrez, and Judulang.333
The Supreme Court held that the new definition of admission in INA §
101(a)(13)(C)(v) created by the IIRIRA in 1996 could not be applied
retroactively to noncitizens with convictions occurring before the
statute’s effective date. 334 This new definition of admission provided that
certain lawful permanent residents with criminal convictions would be
deemed to be seeking admission into the United States upon returning
from abroad. 335 Prior to 1996, Vartelas could have traveled freely outside
329. Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Immigration Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (June 10, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-bymichael-kagan/.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 566 U.S. 257 (2012).
334. Vartelas, 566 U.S. at 259-62.
335. Id. at 262.
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the United States. Upon returning to the United States in 2003 after
visiting his ill parents in Greece for a week, however, he was denied
admission and placed into removal proceedings. 336
The Second Circuit, when deciding Vartelas, explicitly declined to use
Chevron deference. It explained that Chevron was not triggered at step
zero because the BIA was not interpreting a statute it was charged with
administering:
We consider the issue of retroactivity de novo, without giving
deference to the opinion of the BIA, as the question of whether an
IIRIRA amendment “would have an improper retroactive effect in
[a] particular case . . . does not concern the sort of statutory gap that
Congress has designated the BIA to fill, nor a matter in which the
BIA has particular expertise.”337
The Second Circuit held that IIRIRA’s new definition of admission in
INA § 101(a)(13) was not impermissibly retroactive as applied to
Vartelas’ 2003 trip to Greece. 338 Vartelas petitioned for certiorari and was
granted; the Supreme Court held that INA § 101(a)(13(C) was
impermissibly retroactive as applied to Vartelas. 339 The Supreme Court
did not apply Chevron deference, but it also did not actively explain why
it was not appropriate.
B. Themes and Gaps
This Section summarizes the themes and remaining questions from all
of the Supreme Court immigration cases discussed in this Article, both
those that did and those that did not invoke administrative law. Section
III.B.1 argues that this body of case law, considered as a whole,
demonstrates erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism. This
erosion, however, has not proceeded in a linear fashion and has faced
setbacks in recent terms. Section III.B.2 highlights the gaps in the
application of administrative law in immigration cases that remain. These
gaps are the vestiges of a theory of immigration exceptionalism, showing
where the Supreme Court has hesitated in engaging with administrative
law principles in immigration cases on a deeper level.

336. Id. at 264.
337. Vartelas v. Holder, 620 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 37273 (2d Cir. 2008)).
338. Id. at 121.
339. Vartelas, 566 U.S. at 275-76.
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1. Erosion of Immigration Exceptionalism
The analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent immigration and
administrative law jurisprudence in the seven cases discussed in Sections
I and II clearly shows that ordinary administrative law principles are being
invoked in immigration law cases. Neither the Court nor, for the most
part, the parties argue against this phenomenon. The one partial exception
is the judicial review cases, where the government has argued that judicial
review of a particular type of agency decision was precluded. 340 Even
here, however, the government was not arguing that administrative law
doctrine did not apply. It was simply taking the position that, under the
principles of administrative law, judicial review was not available. It is
virtually impossible, in light of this almost universal acceptance of
principles of an outside legal doctrine, to maintain that a strong theory of
immigration exceptionalism governs the Supreme Court’s immigration
jurisprudence. The application of ordinary administrative law principles
in these Supreme Courts cases shows a definite erosion of the theory of
immigration exceptionalism.
The fact that the Supreme Court did not apply administrative law in the
four cases discussed in Section III.A when administrative law principles
were raised by the lower courts or the litigants does not automatically
counter the erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism. First, the
Supreme Court did not consider and reject the application of these
principles; it simply did not mention them.
Second, looking at the results in these cases demonstrates that the Court
did not simply rubberstamp the agency’s action even when not applying
administrative law principles. If the Court was endorsing a theory of
immigration exceptionalism by failing to apply administrative law
principles, one would expect this to be the case. The converse is also not
true; the Court did not automatically overturn the agency action when not
purportedly constraining itself through principles of agency deference.
The government lost in half of these cases, in Moncrieffe and in Vartelas,
the same win/loss rate as in those cases where administrative law was
invoked. 341 In all of the cases, even those where the government
ultimately won (Kawashima and Luna Torres), an in-depth analysis of the
agency’s position was ultimately taken.
Considering, as a whole, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in these
immigration cases where administrative law was arguably applicable
supports an argument that the theory of immigration exceptionalism is
losing its strong hold. At the same time, however, there are many gaps

340. See Section I, supra.
341. Cf. Cole, supra note 163, at 13 n.127.
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and unanswered questions in the Supreme Court’s application of
administrative law in immigration cases. These gaps are discussed in
section III.B.2 below.
2. Unanswered Questions
This section addresses the unanswered questions in the Supreme
Court’s application of administrative law in immigration cases. These
gaps are remnants of immigration exceptionalism; the Court has not yet
engaged with some of the more difficult questions in this application at
more than a surface level. In order for the hold of a theory of immigration
exceptionalism to continue to weaken, the Supreme Court must begin to
explore these questions and provide clear guidance for lower federal
courts and agencies.
Section III.B.2.a discusses one gap common to all of the different areas
of administrative law that have arisen in these immigration cases: whether
administrative law applies in the first place and, if so, which
administrative law doctrine should be invoked. Section III.B.2.b focuses
on the unanswered questions in those cases on the availability of judicial
review, while section III.B.2.c concentrates on the remaining issues in
those cases on the scope of judicial review, or deference to agency
determinations.
a. Overall
The first significant gap in the Supreme Court’s immigration and
administrative law jurisprudence is a threshold inquiry: the Court has
frequently failed to address why administrative law was or was not
applicable. In the cases already discussed in Sections I and II – Din, Reyes
Mata, Martinez Gutierrez, Cuellar de Osorio, Mellouli, Esquivel
Quintana and Judulang – the Court simply invoked administrative law
without explanation. On the other hand, in the cases covered in Section
III.A – Kawashima, Moncrieffe, Luna Torres, and Vartelas – the Court
did not attempt to explain its choice not to operate within an
administrative law framework. In neither set of cases has the Court
spoken to justify its position, and there are no distinguishing factors
between the groups so obvious as to eliminate the need for discussion.
Consideration of whether the Supreme Court should or should not
invoke administrative law in particular immigration contexts is beyond
the scope of this article. Whether courts are better suited than agencies to
answer particular questions, or vice versa, is a complex question. Some
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have even argued that there is not a practical difference in outcome. 342 I
am not attempting to address those questions here.
I am, however, making two particular points about the gaps in the
Supreme Court’s application of administrative law in immigration cases.
First, these unanswered questions are vestiges of immigration
exceptionalism. While the Court is moving away from this theory, there
is some lingering hesitation that results in complex issues being treated at
only a surface level, if at all. In recent terms, particularly in the Court’s
inability to reach agreement in U.S. v. Texas and in its decision in Esquivel
Quintana, administrative law issues were affirmatively avoided. There is
also a lack of precedent. As a practical and theoretical matter, it will take
time for the numerous subsidiary questions to be fully addressed. Second,
administrative law is one possible existing way to control agency action,
and such control is increasingly important in checking agency action that
violates the law and the Constitution and that ignores respect for
individual rights. In that context, to be a better check on the excesses of
the executive and administrative agency, the Supreme Court should
clearly and explicitly answer the question of why administrative law does
or does not apply in each potentially applicable case.
The same is true with respect to the unanswered questions in each of
the sub-areas of administrative law that have been addressed by the
Supreme Court in the last seven terms. To be a better check on the
excesses of the executive and immigration agencies, the Court must
attempt to clearly close the existing gaps in its jurisprudence by applying
administrative law principles in immigration cases. Section III.B.2.b
discusses those existing gaps specific to the availability of judicial review
cases. Section III.B.2.c addresses unanswered questions with respect to
the scope of judicial review, i.e., deference to agency action.
b. Judicial Review
The two judicial review cases, Din and Reyes Mata, reveal a lesser
degree of erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism than the
deference cases discussed in Section III.B.2.c. The Court in both Din and
Reyes Mata struggled most with reconciling historical doctrines that were
part of the theory of immigration exceptionalism, consular nonreviewability, and the plenary power doctrine, with the modern
framework for the availability of judicial review in the APA. That
framework, as previously discussed, presumes the availability of judicial
review unless expressly precluded by statute or committed to agency

342. See, e.g., id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/6

46

Rodriguez: Eroding Immigration Exceptionalism: Administrative Law in the Sup

2018]

IMMIGRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

261

discretion by law.343
The Court and the parties in both Din and Reyes Mata focused
almost exclusively on the historical immigration law doctrines. They
failed to discuss how their arguments or holdings fit into the APA. Thus,
it is not clear in either case whether the Court or the litigants believed that
judicial review was precluded because it was precluded by statute or
because it was committed to agency discretion by law. This is a significant
gap in the Court’s opinions.
c. Deference
The remaining eight Supreme Court cases discussed in this Article all
deal with some aspect of deference to the agency. Three areas of
unanswered questions are most significant: (1) What type of deference, if
any, applies? (2) How should statutory interpretation at step one of the
Chevron analysis be conducted? and (3) What makes an agency action
reasonable at step two of the Chevron analysis? A fourth question also
arises less frequently: What is the role of Brand X in immigration cases?
First, the Supreme Court frequently glosses over the determination of
which type of deference, if any, applies. Is the agency action at issue a
legal interpretation? If so, what happens at Chevron step zero? That is,
does Chevron deference apply to this particular legal interpretation? If
not, is a lesser form of deference such as Skidmore appropriate? Or is the
agency action a policy or factual determination, or something else
altogether? This gap was present in Martinez Gutierrez, where amicus
curiae NIJC argued that BIA decisions, even when containing legal
interpretations, merit only Skidmore deference, not the greater Chevron
deference. 344 It was a particular issue in Judulang, where the Supreme
Court elected, with minimal explanation, to invoke arbitrary and
capricious review instead of the Chevron deference applied by the Ninth
Circuit and argued by the government. 345 It was also central in all of the
cases involving criminal grounds of removability – Mellouli, Esquivel
Quintana, Kawashima, Moncrieffe, and Luna Torres – where the
Supreme Court reached different conclusions regarding the applicability
of Chevron deference without so much as discussing its choices. 346
Finally, it was present in Vartelas, where the Supreme Court failed to
discuss deference after the Second Circuit held explicitly that Chevron
deference was not appropriate because retroactivity was not “the sort of
343. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2011); see also FOX, supra note 71, at § 10.05.
344. See section II.A.1, supra.
345. See section II.B.1, supra.
346. See sections II.A.3 and III.A.1, supra.
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statutory gap that Congress has designated the BIA to fill, nor a matter in
which the BIA has particular expertise.”347
The second two areas of unanswered questions have to do with the two
steps of the Chevron analysis. Step one – determining whether or not
Congress has spoken clearly – appears to be the more challenging of the
two steps in the immigration context. Substantial unresolved questions
about how to conduct statutory interpretation at this stage of the Chevron
analysis exist in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Although none of the
Chevron cases discussed in Section II.A were decided at step one, this gap
is particularly obvious in Cuellar de Osorio, where the Justices were so
divided on how to interpret the provision of the Child Status Protection
Act at issue that there was no majority opinion. 348
Step two of the Chevron analysis appears to be the most fleshed out
and least controversial portion of the analysis. However, some
unanswered questions remain. The line between unreasonable and not
what the Court would prefer is a thin one, and it can be difficult to
determine exactly when agency interpretation crosses the line into
unreasonable. This gap is obvious in three of the Chevron decisions
discussed in Section II.A – Martinez Gutierrez and Cuellar de Osorio,
where the Court found the agency interpretations reasonable, and
Mellouli, where the Court found the agency interpretation unreasonable.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Judulang noted parallels between step
two of the Chevron analysis and arbitrary and capricious review under the
APA. 349 Questions remain as to the significance and implications of this
similarity.
It is worth noting that many of these difficulties with the Chevron
doctrine may not be wholly an issue of the immigration context. As a
doctrine, Chevron has been the subject of substantial criticism. Some have
noted that the doctrine is on the decline.
C. The Future
The Supreme Court will have several opportunities in the October 2017
term to address immigration exceptionalism and the role of administrative
law in immigration cases writ large and to take up some of these
unanswered questions writ small. First, as discussed in the Introduction,
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Trump v. Hawaii and Trump
v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, two of the cases challenging Trump’s

347. Vartelas v. Holder, 620 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 37273 (2nd Cir. 2008)); see section III.A.2, supra.
348. See section II.A.2, supra.
349. See section II.B, supra.
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entry ban executive order. If the cases are not held to be moot, 350 the scope
of the president’s power over immigration issues is likely to be at the heart
of the Court’s decision.
Second, the Supreme Court ordered reargument in two cases from the
October 2016 term: Sessions v. Dimaya and Jennings v. Rodriguez.351
Both cases were decided before Justice Gorsuch joined the Court, so
reargument was presumably ordered because the Court was
deadlocked. 352 In Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court must interpret
and evaluate the constitutionality of another aggravated felony provision,
the crime of violence, which specifically refers to criminal law. 353 In
Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Court is concerned with the right to bond
hearings in immigration detention and the constitutionality of indefinite
detention. 354 If the Supreme Court directly confronts the plenary power
doctrine and the issues of administrative law generally, our understanding
of these complex intersections could take a significant leap forward
during the October 2017 term.
CONCLUSION
The slow and uneven erosion of the theory of immigration
exceptionalism that I found in the INA §§ 212(c) and 212(h) contexts also
holds true on a larger scale. The Supreme Court’s recent immigration
jurisprudence, from the October 2010 through the October 2016 terms,
showed a similar invocation of administrative law principles in some, but
not all, immigration cases where administrative law could be applicable.
Just as in the INA §§ 212(c) and 212(h) cases, in many, if not all, of the
cases where administrative law was or could have been invoked, the Court
failed to fully analyze the relevant doctrinal questions. These unanswered
questions are the remnants of immigration exceptionalism – a function of
the courts’ delay in acknowledging the role of administration law in
immigration cases and a lingering discomfort in applying administrative
principles to immigration questions.
The validity of President Obama’s DACA and DAPA programs and of
President Trump’s executive orders are still being litigated. More
importantly, these actions will not be the last time that a presidential
administration attempts to exercise a strong executive power over

350. Leah Litman, Symposium: The mootness games, SCOTUS BLOG (Jul. 11, 2017, 10:49 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-mootness-games/.
351. Kevin Johnson, No decision in two immigration-enforcement cases, SCOTUS BLOG (Jun. 26,
2017, 4:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/no-decision-two-immigration-enforcement-cases/.
352. Id.
353. Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016).
354. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
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immigration or to justify their exercise through asserting a theory of
immigration exceptionalism. Under the current administration, the courts
have played a central and crucial role in ensuring that these executive
actions respect individual rights and do not violate the statute or the
Constitution. Administrative law has been an important tool for litigants
in bringing these challenges to the courts.
For many reasons, administrative law is not the only or best vehicle
available for these challenges. It is, however, currently part of the law and
currently available and powerful. With greater clarity in its doctrine,
administrative law can be an even more effective vehicle. The Supreme
Court should engage in the application of administrative and
constitutional law principles in immigration cases on a deeper level, in a
thoughtful way that will provide real guidance in other cases and an
example to the lower federal courts. This should result in the faster
erosion of a theory of immigration exceptionalism, which will then have
the positive circular effect of improving the analysis of administrative and
constitutional law principles in immigration cases throughout the federal
courts. Multiple cases in the October 2017 term will give the Court the
opportunity to engage in this way with respect to the role of administrative
law, and particularly deference, in immigration cases. 355

355. The Supreme Court also heard three cases that give it the opportunity to do the same with
constitutional principles in immigration cases and to confront the plenary power doctrine head-on. These
three cases are Sessions v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016); Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545
(2016); and Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
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